Modified Transparency Order Property: Solution or Just Another Attempt by Picek, S. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/147329
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Modified Transparency Order Property:
Solution or Just Another Attempt
Stjepan Picek1,2, Bodhisatwa Mazumdar3,
Debdeep Mukhopadhyay4, and Lejla Batina2,5
1 Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, University of Zagreb, Croatia
2 ICIS - Digital Security Group, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
3 New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi
4 Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
IIT Kharagpur, Kharagpur, India
5 ESAT/COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium
Abstract. S-boxes are usual targets of side-channel attacks and it is an
open problem to develop design techniques for S-boxes with improved
DPA resistance. One result along that line is the transparency order, a
property that attempts to characterize the resilience of S-boxes against
DPA attacks. Recently, it was shown there exist ﬂaws with the original
deﬁnition of transparency, which resulted in the new deﬁnition - modiﬁed
transparency order. This paper develops techniques for constructions us-
ing the modiﬁed transparency as a guiding metric. For the 4 × 4 size,
we signiﬁcantly improve modiﬁed transparency order while remaining in
the optimal classes. Experimental results are provided assuming a noisy
HW leakage model to show the proposed S-boxes are more resistant than
the original one of the PRESENT algorithm. We conclude with reports
on 4× 4 and 8× 8 S-boxes where the results indicate that the modiﬁed
transparency order could be a more useful metric than the transparency
order. However, both measures are far from deﬁnitive solution on how
to improve the DPA resistance.
Keywords: S-box, Modiﬁed transparency order, DPA-resilience,
Lightweight cryptography.
1 Introduction
When discussing the security of modern block ciphers, it is often natural to
discuss it through the prism of resilience against certain cryptographic attacks.
Alongside diﬀerential [1] and linear [2] cryptanalysis, it is expected today that the
algorithm possesses resistance also against side-channel attacks [3]. In order to
defend against the ﬁrst two types of cryptanalysis, Substitution Boxes (S-boxes)
play a signiﬁcant role. In fact, in many block ciphers, S-box is the only nonlinear
part and therefore fundamental for the security of a whole cipher [4]. Somewhat
surprising, in recent years researchers found that S-boxes have inherent resistance
against side-channel analysis (SCA) (some more and some less). Naturally, there
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exist numerous countermeasures such as various hiding and masking schemes
that improve the algorithm resiliency to SCA [5].
First property that connected S-boxes and their resistance against side-channel
attacks was SNR (DPA) [6]. Next, Prouﬀ introduced transparency order [7], a
property that characterizes the resistance of S-boxes to the SCA or more pre-
cisely to diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) [8]. Later, Fei introduced confusion
coeﬃcient where it is possible to separate the target device, the number of traces
and the algorithm under the examination [9–12]. Up to now, transparency order
received the most interest so we can speak about a whole line of research about
the transparency order property as it is detailed below in Section 1.1.
Recently, Chakraborty et al. showed that the original transparency order def-
inition is ﬂawed and they proposed amendments to it that resulted in the modi-
ﬁed transparency order property. However, until now, there has been no practical
examination of this new property.
In accordance with that, in this paper we concentrate on generating S-boxes
that have good values of modiﬁed transparency order property. By good values,
we mean such values that are better than those found in currently used S-boxes.
When generating S-boxes we concentrate on the two most widely used S-
box sizes; more precisely, 4 × 4 and 8 × 8. The ﬁrst one is used in lightweight
cryptographic algorithms like PRESENT [13] or PRINCE [14] while the second
one is used in what is probably the most well-known cryptographic algorithm in
the world - AES [15]. In doing so, we experiment with three diﬀerent approaches
when generating S-boxes: random search, heuristics and aﬃne transformation.
After presenting the newly generated S-boxes for both sizes, we also give SCA
experiments, but only for 4× 4 size. This is due to the two reasons: the ﬁrst one
is that our new S-box has all the same properties as the S-boxes currently used
except it is superior in modiﬁed transparency order property. The second reason
is that our S-box is possible to implement only as a lookup table which does not
represent a diﬃculty for that size. When considering 8 × 8 size, both of those
arguments do not hold.
1.1 Related Work
Leander and Poschmann classify all optimal 4 × 4 S-boxes [4]. Some exam-
ples of algorithms using optimal S-boxes are PRESENT [13], PRINCE [14] and
Noekeon [16].
Regarding modiﬁed transparency order property, except for the paper that
presented the property [17], there are currently no other works. However, when
discussing the original transparency order property there are many (sometimes
contradicting) results. After Prouﬀ in 2005 deﬁned transparency order [7], for a
couple of years this property did not attract a lot of attention. However, from
2012 there have been several works exploring that property. Mazumdar et al.
construct rotation symmetric S-boxes with high nonlinearity and DPA resis-
tance [18]. The same authors use constrained random search to ﬁnd S-boxes
with low transparency order and high nonlinearity [19]. Picek et al. use heuris-
tics to evolve S-boxes that have improved values of transparency order property
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for 8 × 8 size [20] and 4 × 4 size [21]. The same authors investigate one more
measure, namely, confusion coeﬃcient that characterizes the resilience of S-boxes
against DPA attacks [22]. Evci and Kavut show the minimal aﬃne transforma-
tion needed to change transparency order property [23]. Nguyen et al. investigate
the inﬂuence of transparency order property on Serpent-type S-boxes [24].
1.2 Our Contributions
There are two main contributions in this paper. Our ﬁrst contribution is that, to
our best knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to generate S-boxes with improved values of
modiﬁed transparency order property. In order to do that we use two techniques;
heuristics and aﬃne transformation. For the 4× 4 size, we ﬁnd the best possible
value of modiﬁed transparency order as well as lower and upper bounds for all
16 optimal classes. The second contribution is extensive DPA analysis of several
newly generated S-boxes as well as their comparison with the PRESENT S-box.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives basic in-
formation about cryptographic properties of S-boxes. In Section 3, we present
S-boxes that have improved values of modiﬁed transparency order. Furthermore,
we give a comparison between several methods capable of generating S-boxes.
Side-channel analysis of a number of S-boxes with improved modiﬁed trans-
parency order values as well as PRESENT S-box is presented in Section 4. Fi-
nally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Here, we present basic notions about cryptographic properties of S-boxes that
are of direct interest in this research.
2.1 Optimal S-boxes
First, it would be beneﬁcial to oﬀer an answer which S-boxes are actually suit-
able in practice. When considering 4 × 4 S-boxes, there exist in total 16! bijec-
tive S-boxes which is approximately 244 options to search from. Leander and
Poschmann deﬁne optimal S-boxes as those that are bijective, have linearity
equal to 8 and δ-uniformity equal to 4. Since the linearity that equals 8 is the
same as nonlinearity of 4, we continue using the nonlinearity property instead
of the linearity. By using some shortcuts they found that all optimal S-boxes
belong to 16 classes, i.e. all optimal S-boxes are aﬃne equivalent to one of those
16 classes [4].
Therefore, for the 4× 4 S-box size, we concentrate only on optimal S-boxes as
those of practical interest. Indeed, as far as the authors know, all ciphers that
use 4× 4 S-boxes actually use optimal S-boxes [13, 14, 16, 25].
For the 8 × 8 size, there exists no such classiﬁcation, but in general it is
believed that nonlinearity of 112 is the maximum possible and therefore the best
S-boxes should reach that nonlinearity [26]. There are other conditions except
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the nonlinearity property, but highly nonlinear S-boxes usually also have other
classical properties with good values [26,27]. In accordance to that, for the 8× 8
size, we restrict our attention to the same properties as for the 4× 4 size.
2.2 Cryptographic Properties of S-boxes
Here, we discuss the properties that are used to deﬁne optimal S-boxes: bijectiv-
ity, nonlinearity and δ-uniformity [4]. Besides those properties, we also formally
introduce two properties that constitute the core of this research: transparency
order and modiﬁed transparency order.
The addition modulo 2 is denoted as “ ⊕ ”. The inner product of vectors a¯
and b¯ is denoted as a¯ · b¯ and equals a¯ · b¯ = ⊕ni=1aibi.
Function F, called S-box or vectorial Boolean function, of size (n,m) is deﬁned
as any mapping F from Fn2 to F
m
2 [7].
The Hamming weight HW of a vector a¯, where a¯ ∈ Fn2 , is the number of
non-zero positions in the vector.
An (n,m)-function is called balanced if it takes every value of Fm2 the same
number 2n−m of times [26]. Balanced (n, n)-functions are permutations on Fn2 .
Nonlinearity NLF of an (n,m)-function F equals the minimum nonlinearity
of all non-zero linear combinations b¯ · F of its coordinate functions fi, where
b¯ = 0 [28]:
NLF = 2
n−1 − 1
2
max a¯ ∈ Fn2
v¯ ∈ Fm∗2
|WF (a¯, v¯)|. (1)
Here, WF (a¯, v¯) represents the Walsh-Hadamard transform of F [7]:
WF (a¯, v¯) =
∑
x¯∈Fn2
(−1)v¯·F (x¯)⊕a¯·x¯. (2)
Diﬀerential delta uniformity δ represents the largest value in the diﬀerence
distribution table without counting the value 2n in the ﬁrst row and ﬁrst column
position [1, 26, 29].
Prouﬀ introduced transparency order property of S-boxes which can be de-
ﬁned for a (n,m)-function as follows [7]:
TF = maxβ¯∈Fm2 (|m− 2HW (β¯)| −
1
22n − 2n∑
a¯∈Fn∗2
|
∑
v¯ ∈ Fm2
HW (v¯) = 1
(−1)v¯·β¯WDaF (0¯, v¯)|). (3)
Here, WDaF represents Walsh-Hadamard transform of the derivative of F
with respect to a vector a ∈ Fn2 . For further information about the transparency
order property, we refer readers to [7, 28].
Recently, researchers presented modiﬁed transparency order property in or-
der to deal with some errors in the original deﬁnition [17]. This new, modiﬁed
transparency order property equals:
214 S. Picek et al.
MTF = maxβ¯∈Fm2 (m−
1
22n − 2n
∑
a¯∈Fn∗2
m∑
j=1
|AFj (a) +
m∑
i=1,i=j
(−1)βi⊕βjCFi,Fj (a)|),
(4)
where AFj (a) represents the autocorrelation function of F and CFi,Fj (a) repre-
sents the crosscorrelation function. The crosscorrelation CFi,Fj (a) between func-
tions Fi and Fj equals:
CFi,Fj (a) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)Fi(x)⊕Fj(x⊕a). (5)
We do not give an exhaustive explanation behind the modiﬁed transparency
order, but rather we enumerate main problems with the original deﬁnition of
transparency order which are corrected in the new, modiﬁed measure. In [19], it
was shown that the autocorrelation spectra properties of the coordinate functions
have a bearance on the resistivity of the S-box towards power analysis attacks.
Further, the crosscorrelation term in the modiﬁed transparency order show that
the coordinate functions when selected in a pairwise fashion, also aﬀect the
resistance to the power based side-channel attacks. Therefore, along with the
diﬀerential uniformity [30], several cryptographic properties of an S-box such
as the autocorrelation spectra and the crosscorrelation spectra properties also
determine the side-channel resistivity of an S-box.
In the transparency order property, there is a maximization over all values
of β which is shown to be redundant. Next, the crosscorrelation terms between
coordinate functions is assumed to be 0 in the original deﬁnition which is not
the case in general. Finally, when considering lower bound in the original trans-
parency order, it is calculated for bent functions, but the property itself is deﬁned
only for balanced functions [17]. In the original deﬁnition of the transparency
order, the coordinate functions of an S-box are assumed to be balanced, which
though correct for popular S-boxes in block ciphers, is not correct on the entire
space of S-box functions. This makes the deﬁnition of original transparency order
incorrect for S-boxes with unbalanced coordinate functions like bent functions.
For instance, it was shown in Chakraborty et al. that for an S-box with pairwise
complement coordinate functions which are bent, DPA is not possible [17]. But
from the deﬁnition, transparency order is maximum for such S-boxes, which in-
dicates high vulnerability towards the DPA attacks. This contradiction renders
the original deﬁnition of transparency order incorrect.
2.3 Aﬃne Equivalence
For two (n, n)-functions S1 and S2 to be aﬃne equivalent, the following equation
needs to hold:
S2(x) = B(S1(A(x) ⊕ a))⊕ b, (6)
where A and B are invertible n× n matrices and a, b are constants in Fn2 .
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Picek et al. showed that aﬃne transformation can be used to generate aﬃne
equivalent S-boxes that have diﬀerent values of the transparency order and the
confusion coeﬃcient properties [21, 22].
3 Generating S-boxes
In this section, we use several techniques to generate S-boxes with improved
modiﬁed transparency order. Furthermore, we conduct a comparison between
those methods and give an analysis of the lower and upper bounds for the mod-
iﬁed transparency order of 4× 4 S-boxes.
3.1 Random Search
For random search, solutions are generated by creating uniformly at random a
permutation list of values from 0 to 2n−1. Distribution of the random S-boxes
values is shown in Table 1 for the 4× 4 size and Table 2 for 8× 8 size.
Table 1. Distribution of random S-boxes property values, 4× 4, 5 000 evaluations.
Property Max Min Mean Std. dev.
NLF 4 0 2.1 0.69
δ-uniformity 16 4 6.7 1.37
MTF 2.93 1.6 2.44 0.14
Table 2. Distribution of random S-boxes property values, 8× 8, 1 000 evaluations.
Property Max Min Mean Std. dev.
NLF 98 84 92.57 2.13
δ-uniformity 16 10 11.37 1.21
MTF 6.9 6.83 6.86 0.01
3.2 Genetic Algorithm
In accordance with the related works, e.g. [21,31], we experiment with heuristics
to evolve S-boxes that have good modiﬁed transparency order values. For the
algorithm of the choice, we use genetic algorithm (GA) since it proved to be
a good choice in related works. We emphasize that the genetic algorithm does
not necessarily represent the best possible approach how to solve this problem,
but rather an option one has at his disposal. For a detailed explanation about
genetic algorithms, we refer interested readers to [32].
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To represent the problem, we use a permutation representation where an S-
box is represented with decimal values between 0 and 2n − 1, where each of
those values is one entry for the S-box lookup table. For the permutation repre-
sentation, a mutation operator is selected uniformly at random between insert
and inversion mutation [32]. Recombination operator is selected uniformly at
random between the partially mapped crossover (PMX) [33] and order crossover
OX [34]. Both of those crossover operators are among the most common ones
for the permutation encoding.
Fitness Functions. When investigating 4×4 size, ﬁtness function combines all
the properties that the optimal S-box must have plus the modiﬁed transparency
order. The goal is to maximize the following function:
fitness = NLF + (n−MTF ) + (2n − δ). (7)
We subtract MTF and δ-uniformity values from the maximum obtainable
values since we represent the problem as a maximization problem and those
properties need to be as small as possible.
For the 8 × 8 case, ﬁtness function equals the sum of nonlinearity (NF ) and
modiﬁed transparency order as follows:
fitness = NLF + (n−MTF ). (8)
For this size, we do not add δ-uniformity to the equation since all our ex-
periments show that it does not help in converging to better solutions, but just
makes the evolution process longer.
Common Parameters. Parameters for the GA are the following: the sizes of
(n, n)-function are 4 and 8, number of independent runs for each evolutionary
experiment is 50 and the population size is 50. Tournament size in steady-state
tournament selection is equal to 3. Mutation probability is set to 0.3 per indi-
vidual. This mutation rate is set on a basis of tuning phase where it showed
good results. The evolution process lasts until there is 50 generations without
improvement of the best solution. Common parameters are additionally given in
Table 3.
3.3 Evolved S-boxes
For the 4× 4 size, the best value of modiﬁed transparency order we found with
the genetic algorithm is 1.9 for an optimal S-box. The transparency order and
the modiﬁed transparency order values for our evolved S-box as well as for the
PRESENT S-box and random S-box are presented in Table 4.
Next, in Table 5, we display a solution that have the best modiﬁed trans-
parency order (1.9) property that we found with the genetic algorithm and that
belongs to the one of the optimal classes.
As it can be seen, for the 4 × 4 size, it is possible to obtain S-box that has
signiﬁcantly lower value of modiﬁed transparency order while remaining in one
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Table 3. Common parameters for GA.
Parameter Parameter value
Tournament size k 3
Population size 50
Number of experiments 50
Mutation probability 0.3 per individual
Stopping criterion 50 generations without improvement
Table 4. Properties of evolved S-boxes, modiﬁed transparency order, 4 × 4.
S-box MTF TF
PRESENT 2.467 3.53
Random S-box 2.44 3.47
Evolved S-box 1.9 3.267
Table 5. S-box evolved with the genetic algorithm.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S(x) 2 0 C 6 A E F 7 3 1 8 4 9 D B 5
of the optimal classes. Next, we display results for the 8× 8 size in Table 6. As
it can be seen, in this case properties like the nonlinearity, δ-uniformity, GAC
(ΔF and σF ) [35] signiﬁcantly deteriorate for the evolved S-boxes. In Figures 1
and 2, we display results for random, AES and evolved S-boxes for sizes 4 × 4
and 8× 8, respectively.
3.4 Aﬃne Transformations
It has been shown that the transparency order property is not aﬃne invariant
under certain aﬃne transformations [21]. Therefore, we investigate whether the
same applies when considering modiﬁed transparency order property. We apply
four aﬃne transformations as given in [21], where we see that the transformations
3 and 4 change the modiﬁed transparency order values (as is the case for the
transparency order property [21]). Those aﬃne transformations are based on
Eq. (6).
By following the reasoning from [23], we observe that we can apply the same
transformation as in that work in order to conduct an exhaustive search. That
aﬃne transformation has the following form:
S2(x) = B(S1(x)). (9)
Note that the aﬃne transformation in Eq. (9) is the special form of transfor-
mations 3 and 4 from [21] where constants c and d equal 0 and matrix B is the
identity matrix.
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Table 6. Properties of evolved S-boxes, modiﬁed transparency order, 8 × 8.
S-box NLF MTF TF δ ΔF σF
AES S-box 112 6.916 7.86 4 32 133120
Random S-box 92 6.869 9.173 12 96 272128
Evolved S-box 1 100 6.815 7.761 10 104 258304
Evolved S-box 2 98 6.67 7.7 14 96 272896
Fig. 1. Nonlinearity versus modiﬁed transparency order, 4× 4.
Fig. 2. Nonlinearity versus modiﬁed transparency order, 8× 8.
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Results of exhaustive search for all 16 optimal classes’ lower and upper bounds
are given in Table 7. Additionally, we oﬀer results for class representatives where
G1 to G15 are the usual acronyms for the 16 optimal S-box classes.
Table 7. Modiﬁed transparency values, 4× 4 size.
S-box MTF
Min Max Class representative
G0 2.067 3 2.23
G1 1.9 2.8 2.53
G2 2.03 2.867 2.56
G3 2.4 2.8 2.46
G4 2.3 2.83 2.56
G5 2.33 2.93 2.53
G6 2.23 2.73 2.46
G7 2.26 2.7 2.53
G8 2.03 2.867 2.3
G9 2.167 2.8 2.5
G10 2.167 2.767 2.36
G11 2.23 2.667 2.46
G12 2.33 2.83 2.5
G13 2.26 2.9 2.66
G14 2.2 2.93 2.6
G15 2.13 2.9 2.5
We see there is only one class that reaches the minimal value of 1.9 and there
are 10 diﬀerent maximal values over all classes. In Figure 3, we give a frequency
distribution of all values under the aﬃne transformation from Eq. (9) for the
optimal class G1.
Note that the best value from the exhaustive search is the same as from the
genetic algorithm. This shows that such heuristics should present a viable choice
when generating S-boxes of comparable sizes. For larger sizes we believe heuris-
tics like genetic algorithms are not appropriate. This stems from two important
facts. The ﬁrst one is that the generated S-boxes have signiﬁcantly worse val-
ues for properties like the nonlinearity and δ-uniformity. The second reason is
that the equation for calculating the modiﬁed transparency order is much more
complex and computationally demanding than in the case of e.g. original trans-
parency order property. This results in relatively slow evaluation of the modiﬁed
transparency order property, a fact not so important when it is necessary to
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Fig. 3. Frequency distribution of MTF values for the class G1.
run the equation only a several times. However, for heuristics like genetic algo-
rithm where the number of evaluations can be rather large, this means the whole
process will be long.
When considering 8×8 size, it is not possible to conduct an exhaustive search
since the search space is still to large. Therefore, we run experiment with the
aﬃne transformation as for the 4 × 4 size, but for 1 000 randomly generated B
matrices. The best value we found equals 6.89 (while AES S-box has 6.916).
4 Success Rate Evaluation of DPA Attacks on the
Synthesized S-boxes
In this section, we evaluate the generated 4 × 4 S-boxes when these S-boxes
are subjected to key-recovery attacks like diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) in
the form of statistical analysis of the physically observables like power traces
to eﬃciently discriminate the secret key. In this set of experiments, we consider
Pearson’s coeﬃcient as the statistical analysis parameter.
In this experiment, we consider the standalone module of an S-box to which
the input is the XOR of the secret key and the input message. We employ the
security metric called success rate to measure how easily the physical observable
can be turned into a successful attack [36]. The eﬃciency of a side-channel attack
to reach a certain success rate (e.g. 80%) is the minimum average number of
queries such that the success rate of this attack attains the value (80%). Here,
we measure this eﬃciency of the DPA attacks in terms of number of queries
required to extract the secret key.
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We inspect the Gaussian noise distribution N with zero mean and standard
deviation σ added to the Hamming weight of the S-box output S(x⊕ k) as the
physically observable power trace. From the literature, this is the standard power
model for hardware implementation and as for the software implementation, this
power model in the microprocessor is applied on each instruction execution [3].
In order to evaluate the success rate, we observe the number of successful
attempts to extract the secret key out of several random attempts to attack on
an average. The success rate of the correlation analysis DPA attacks with noise
with standard deviation values from 0.1 to 2.0 on the synthesized S-boxes is
shown in Fig. 4. We also perform the same experiment on the PRESENT 4× 4
S-box whose results are shown in Fig. 5. In comparison of success rate results
in both the ﬁgures, we ﬁnd that in the presence of noise with high standard
deviation, the success rate of DPA attacks of the synthesized S-boxes is less
than that of the PRESENT S-boxes.
From Table 8, for Gaussian noise with standard deviation as high as 2.0,
the maximum success rate attained in our class of synthesized S-boxes is less
than half of that of PRESENT S-box. In the case the standard deviation of the
Gaussian noise is small, the number of queries required to attain a success rate
of 80% in case of our synthesized S-boxes is lesser compared to the PRESENT
S-box. Furthermore, in the same table we give data about the transparency
order and confusion coeﬃcient values for all S-boxes. We can observe that the
properties are not in line, e.g. diﬀerent properties point that diﬀerent S-boxes
have the best DPA resistance. Further, the success rate for small number of
queries is very small in both PRESENT S-box as well as our class of synthesize S-
boxes. Also, contrary to the fact that the success rate of correlation DPA should
increase with increasing number of queries, the dip in success rates (especially
for PRESENT S-box) is signiﬁcant for some regions of increasing queries. Similar
results were observed in existing literature for classiﬁcation rates of S-boxes with
increasing number of queries [37].
Table 8. Comparison of modiﬁed transparency order parameter with success rates of
the DPA attacks
S-box TF MTF Conf. coeﬀ. # queries to reach 100%
success rate (SD=0.1)
Max success
rate (SD=2.0)
PRESENT 3.533 2.467 1.709 8 65%
S-box 1 3.267 1.9 1.145 8 28%
S-box 2 3.4 2.167 1.615 10 32%
S-box 3 3.333 2.2 1.615 8 35%
S-box 4 3.4 2.233 1.145 7 34%
S-box 5 3.467 2.267 1.145 6 32%
S-box 6 3.467 2.3 0.956 11 34%
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(a) Success rate plots for the correlation analysis DPA on sim-
ulated power traces of S-box 1.
(b) Success rate plots for the correlation analysis DPA on sim-
ulated power traces of S-box 2.
(c) Success rate plots for the correlation analysis DPA on sim-
ulated power traces of S-box 3.
(d) Success rate plots for the correlation analysis DPA on sim-
ulated power traces of S-box 4.
Fig. 4. Success rate plots for the correlation analysis DPA on simulated power traces
of the generated S-boxes.
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(e) Success rate plots for the correlation analysis DPA on sim-
ulated power traces of S-box 5.
(f) Success rate plots for the correlation analysis DPA on sim-
ulated power traces of S-box 6.
Fig. 4. (Continued)
Fig. 5. Success rate plots for the correlation analysis DPA on simulated power traces
of PRESENT S-box.
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Although smaller modiﬁed transparency order should result in an S-box with
better DPA resistivity, our experiments show that in the case of small diﬀer-
ences in modiﬁed transparency, such behavior is hard to obtain. This behavior
is similar to that what can be observed when examining original transparency
order measure. However, there are at least two advantages of using the modiﬁed
transparency order. The ﬁrst one is the fact the researcher would use the correct
formula (although, sometimes practical results do not show signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between properties). The second advantage is that the correlation between the
modiﬁed transparency order values and max. success rates is more easily notice-
able, although not linear. The answer whether the modiﬁed transparency order
property is a suﬃcient countermeasure against DPA attacks highly depends on
the level of noise in the settings. However, we believe it is not enough (similar to
other DPA related S-box properties), but instead should be used in combination
with some other countermeasures like masking.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we consider the inﬂuence of the modiﬁed transparency order prop-
erty to the DPA resistance of S-boxes. We generate S-boxes that have improved
values of the modiﬁed transparency order where for the 4× 4 size, we remain in
the optimal classes. When considering 8× 8 size, the improvement in the modi-
ﬁed transparency comes at the cost of the deterioration of other properties like
the nonlinearity or δ-uniformity. Furthermore, we show the minimal necessary
aﬃne transformation needed to change the modiﬁed transparency order value.
Based on that transformation, we show that the value obtained by our genetic
algorithm is indeed the optimal one. In doing so, we also show that only one of
16 optimal classes for the 4× 4 size can reach the best possible value for modi-
ﬁed transparency. We use the same aﬃne transformation to ﬁnd the upper and
lower bound for modiﬁed transparency order for all 16 optimal classes. Finally,
we conduct practical SCA experiments with our new S-boxes as well as with
the PRESENT S-box. From the results, we observe that the number of neces-
sary traces for the successful attack is signiﬁcantly lower for our S-boxes than
for the PRESENT S-box in the presence of noise. Although our results indicate
that the modiﬁed transparency order is more reliable measure than the original
transparency order, we still do not deem it suﬃciently strong to be considered
without other countermeasures.
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